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Abstract
Humeanism – the idea that there are no necessary connections between distinct existences – and Nomic
Essentialism – the idea that properties essentially play the nomic roles that they do – are two of the most
important and influential positions in the metaphysics of science. Traditionally, it has been thought that
these positions were incompatible competitors.
We disagree. We argue that there is an attractive version of Humeanism that captures the idea that, for
example, mass essentially plays the role that it actually does in the laws of nature.
In this paper we consider the arguments that have lead many to conclude that Humeanism cannot
be combined with Nomic Essentialism; we identify the weaknesses in these arguments; and we argue in
detail that a version of Humeanism based on a variant of the Best System account of laws captures the key
intuitions behind nomic essentialism.
Here is an intuition: Nothing can be mass if it doesn’t act like mass. This might seem trivial – of course
mass has to act like mass, how could it do anything else? But we can understand the intuition better when
we consider certain modal claims: The intuition is that if there is some possible world where some property,
P, doesn’t act like mass does in our world then P is not mass. If in some other world a property, Q, acts just
like the economic property of inflation acts in our world then Q (whether or not it’s ever instantiated in our
world) is not mass. This implies that in any possible world if there is the property mass then that property
must act like mass does in our world. That is to say, it is necessary that the property mass acts in the way it
does in our world – it plays the mass-role necessarily.
This is an attractive thought. A similarly attractive intuition runs in the other direction: If something
acts likemass – for instance, determining the degree to which a body resists changes in its motion – then it is
mass. If we know that some property plays the mass-role then we don’t need to do any further investigation
to find out what it is – it’s mass. And if we find a property P and a property Q that both play the mass-role,
then P and Q are the same property – mass. Anything that fills the mass-role is necessarily mass.
!Thanks to Heather Demarest, Mike Hicks, Vera Matarese and an audience at the University of Birmingham for very helpful
feedback. In addition, thanks to all those who helped us with Bhogal and Perry (2017), to which this paper is a follow-up.
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We’ll use the term ‘Nomic Necessitarianism’ to refer to the class of views which capture these intuitions.
Specifically, we will count a view as a nomic necessitarian view if it says that (i) a physical property pos-
sesses its nomic role – its role in the physical laws (whatever, ontologically, those laws happen to be) – as a
matter of metaphysical necessity and (ii) as a matter of metaphysical necessity, no other property possesses
that nomic role. That is, a nomic necessitarian view says that, necessarily, P is mass if and only if it plays
the mass-role.
Nomic necessitarianism is often accepted as part of a larger view which says that the essence of a prop-
erty is its nomic role. The idea is that, as we discover more about what mass’s nomic role is in our world,
we are thereby discovering what it is to be the property, mass – the defining feature of property mass is that
it plays that particular nomic role. Call this view nomic essentialism. For now, we will focus on nomic
necessitarianism. Towards the end of the paper we will extend our reasoning to nomic essentialism.1
There are a variety of different ontological positions that necessitarians could take in developing their
view. Often, these involve some variation on the notion of powers, whether these be causal powers, essential
dispositions to do X under stimulus Y, or essential ‘capacities’ to exhibit certain law-like behavior, among
others. (For variants of these views see, e.g., Shoemaker (1980), Ellis (2007), Swoyer (1982), Bird (2007),
Mumford (2004), Vetter (2015), Chakravartty (2003), Cartwright (1989).) On such views, for something
to have mass, it must necessarily possess certain powers (or dispositions, or something similar), and any
property that confers those powers thereby plays the mass-role.
But, notably, these ontologies seem to be inconsistent with a Humean metaphysics. Roughly speaking,
the Humean thinks that there are no necessary connections between distinct existences. This view is often
developed by giving an account of laws, and related notions, that reduces them to the patterns of local
events spread out across spacetime. In fact, it’s commonly thought that it is impossible to have any nomic
necessitarian view that is compatible with the Humean worldview – that there is an inconsistency between
the Humean approach and saying that properties have their nomic roles as a matter of metaphysical neces-
sity.
The aim of this paper is to show that a Humean can capture nomic necessitarian and nomic essentialist
intuitions. We can, contrary to what many have thought, combine the sparse Humean metaphysics with an
account of physical properties according to which, necessarily, a property is mass just in case it plays the
mass-role.2
1Important terminological note: People sometimes use the term ‘necessitarian’ to refer to views like Armstrong’s (1983) and
Dretske’s (1977) which do not capture the above intuition and instead say that laws consist in the holding of a ‘necessitation’ relation
between universals. (See, for example, the PhilPapers.org page on ‘Necessitarianism’ (Schrenk, 2020).) But often it’s used in the way
we are using it (for example, in the Stanford Encyclopedia Article on laws of nature (Carroll, 2016) and Bird (2007)).
2This Humean nomic essentialism should not be confused with views like Demarest’s (2017), which combine an anti-Humean
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We start in section 1 by discussing the motivations for nomic necessitarianism. Section 2 describes
Humeanism in more detail and considers the line of thought that has convinced many that Humeanism is
inconsistent with nomic necessitarianism. Section 3 argues that this line of thought is not as conclusive as it
may seem and actually allows an opening for a certain type of Humean nomic necessitarianism. In section
4 we appeal some previous work of ours – specifically the ‘Two-State Humean’ approach that we developed
in Bhogal and Perry (2017) – to show how a Humean account can capture the nomic necessitarian intuition,
at least with respect to a certain class of properties. In section 5 we discuss some possible limitations of the
view. In section 6 we show how the argument extends to the nomic essentialism intuition.
1 Motivating Necessitarianism
Let’s start by considering the motivation for nomic necessitarianism, the view that something is mass just
in case it plays the mass-role.
The main argument for nomic necessitarianism is epistemic. Here’s a case: Take the property, P, which
plays the mass-role in our world – that is, determining the degree to which an object resists changes in
its motion when impressed by external forces and determining the strength of the gravitational field that
object produces – and imagine it plays the charge-role in another world, w1 – that is, determining the
strength with which an object repels like-charged entities and attracts oppositely-charged ones.
P plays the mass-role in our world but plays the charge-role in w1. Conversely, imagine that the prop-
erty, Q, which plays the charge-role in our world, plays the mass-role in w1. Suppose this switch in the
roles of P and Q is the only difference between the two worlds.
So we have two worlds, the actual world and w1, which, in one sense, differ tremendously: the funda-
mental physical properties are distributed in vastly different ways in the two worlds and those properties
play very different roles in the laws of the two worlds – the pattern of instantiation of P and Q differ hugely
between the two worlds. However, in another sense, the actual world and w1 are extremely similar. Indeed,
‘from the inside’ they would be in-principle indistinguishable by observation or physical measurement.
Our ability to investigate the world, scientifically, is only able to tell us that some property occupies the
mass-role, not whether the property occupying it is P or Q. This is the point that Lewis (2009) is making
when he says: ‘To be the ground of a disposition is to occupy a role, but it is one thing to know that a role
is occupied, another thing to know what occupies it’.
The idea is that we receive evidence about properties, and their instantiations, via their causal influence
on the world. Specifically, our evidence about properties comes from their causal influence on our sense
nomic essentialist ontology with a Humean style account of laws.
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organs. As such, the evidence we have for the existence and instantiation of a property is only ever evidence
for there being something playing a particular nomic role. If P plays a particular role in one world, and so
affects our sense organs in a certain way, this is indistinguishable from a world where Q plays that exact
role and has the same effect on our sense organs.
For the nomic non-necessitarian, then, there are features of the world that are entirely epistemically
blocked off to us, namely, what properties are playing a particular role. That is, it is a fact that P, or Q, or
some other property plays the mass-role, but we can’t know which property plays the role. Properties like
this are called “quiddities” (from the latin ‘quid’, or ‘what’). Perhaps more problematically, for properties
that are quiddities, the fact that the property instantiated at a given world is P rather than Q does nothing
to constrain the physical behavior of the things instantiating P.
The necessitarian does not face these issues. For them, once you’ve fully specified a property’s nomic
role at some world, there is nothing left to know. Mass necessarily plays the mass-role, and the mass role is
necessarily played only by the property mass so there cannot be two different worlds which differ merely
quiddistically. That is, there cannot be two worlds that agree about what roles are being played (there is
something playing the mass-role, and something playing the charge-role, and so on) but differ only in what
properties are playing those roles.
The necessitarian view has the advantage, then, that it does not commit to these undetectable features
of the ontology. There is no epistemic gap between the role that some property plays and the identity of
the property.
The second advantage of necessitarianism is a closely related one. The core nomic necessitarian intuition
meshes very well with our conception of scientific practice as a means of investigating and theorizing about
the physical world. The necessitarian can more satisfactorily explain how the practice of science helps
achieve its aims, as Lewis describes them:
Thus the business of [physical science] is not just to discover laws and causal explanations.
In putting forward as comprehensive theories that recognise only a limited range of natural
properties, physics proposes inventories of the natural properties instantiated in our world. Of
course, the discovery of natural properties is inseparable from the discovery of laws. For an
excellent reason to think that some hitherto unsuspected natural properties are instantiated
- properties deserving of recognition by physics, the quark colours as they might be – is that
without them, no satisfactory system of laws can be found. (Lewis, 1983, pp. 364-365)
For Lewis, one of the key roles of our fundamental empirical science is to discover what the (perfectly)
natural properties instantiated at our world are – the ones in terms of which our physical laws, and the
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best systematization of the world in general, are most perspicuously formulated. But, if it’s epistemically
inaccessible to us whether the mass-role is played by P or Q, then physical science could not tell us what
natural properties are instantiated at our world. It would only tell us that some property or other plays that
role.
Again, necessitarianism avoids this problem by removing the epistemic gap between the role that some
property plays and the identity of the property.
There are significant attractions to the necessitarian position, but it has traditionally been thought that
the Humean about laws of nature cannot enjoy these attractions. In the next section we will consider why
people have thought this.
2 Necessitarianism and Humeanism
It’s widely accepted that the Humean cannot capture the necessitarian intuition. And many (e.g. Bird
(2007, section 4.2), Ellis and Lierse (1994, p.30), Lierse (1996)) have taken this to be a decisive reason to
reject Humeanism. In this section we will look at a common line of thought that suggests that the nomic
necessitarian intuition is inconsistent with Humeanism. While this line of thought is powerful it does
not totally preclude a Humean necessitarianism. In fact, it points us towards the features that a genuine
Humean necessitarian view must have.
2.1 Humeanism and Necessary Connections
Let’s start by characterizing Humeanism more clearly. The core Humean intuition, stemming directly from
the work of Hume, is a denial of necessary connections:
(NNC) There are no necessary connections between distinct existences.
A necessary connection obtains between two entities when the existence or state of one entity meta-
physically entails that some other entity must exist or occupy a certain state. For entities to be ‘distinct
existences’ is for them to be, roughly understood, wholly different things. Consider, as a contrast, a pair, A
and B, where A is a proper part of B. In that case, A and B are not distinct existences, even though they are
numerically distinct. Similarly, the property being scarlet isn’t a distinct existence from being red. Necessary
connections between these non-distinct existences don’t violate Humeanism. If you’re a fan of ground-
ing talk, you can say that A and B are distinct existences if and only if they have wholly non-overlapping
grounding chains (that is to say, neither partially grounds the other and they don’t have a common partial
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ground).
(NNC) provides a constraint on Humean metaphysics, but there are a variety of different ontological
pictures that can satisfy this constraint. Nowadays the most common ontological picture appeals to the
Humean Mosaic. The mosaic consists of the intrinsic physical state of each spacetime point (or each point-
like object) and the spatiotemporal relations between these points. Humeans often claim that all the facts
about the world – including, notably, all the nomic facts, reduce to the Humean mosaic (Lewis, 1986, pp.
iv-vi).
This claim that all the facts reduce to the mosaic satisfies (NNC) because the reduction claim implies
that the fundamental facts are assignments of intrinsic states to each point, and a state being intrinsic to
an entity means that it can obtain regardless of anything else in the world. Hence there are no necessary
connections between these states. (Bhogal and Perry, 2017, p. 75)
So, we have a couple of ways of expressing the Humean intuition – the thought that there are no nec-
essary connection between distinct existences and the thought that all the facts about the world reduce to
facts about the mosaic.
Given these formulations we can see why nomic necessitarianism seems to be in conflict with the very
spirit of Humeanism. We can bring this out in two different ways:
2.2 A Toy Example
Consider a toy scientific law that says ‘whenever a spatial point has property A at time, tn, then it comes to
have property B at a later time, tn+1’, where A and B are fundamental properties. According to the nomic
necessitarian, this law is metaphysically necessary: Any world where it looks like As are not followed by Bs
is in fact a world without As (and without Bs) – properties, that is, have their nomic roles necessarily.
If the nomic necessitarian is correct then this law involves a necessary connection between distinct
existences. Why? There is a necessary connection between A and B – if a point has A at tn then that
metaphysically necessitates the point having B at tn+1. And A and B are distinct existences. We know
this because A and B are fundamental and any non-identical fundamentalia are guaranteed to be distinct
existences. In grounding terms, if A and B are fundamental entities then this guarantees that A neither
grounds B, is grounded by B, nor has any grounds in common with B (since they don’t have any grounds,
period).
So this toy law in conjunction with nomic necessitarianism seems to violate Humeanism. But clearly this
result is not specific to our toy law. Other, more realistic laws involving fundamental properties will violate
Humeanism in just the same way; they will posit necessary connections between fundamental properties
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and entities.
2.3 The Humean Addiction to Quiddities
Here’s the second way to see the apparent conflict between Humeanism and nomic necessitatianism. In sec-
tion 1, we noted that one benefit of nomic necessitarianism is that it avoids having to accept the possibility
of two worlds that differ only quiddistically, i.e. worlds that have the very same nomic roles instantiated,
and so are indistinguishable to us, but are genuinely distinct due to different properties playing the differ-
ent roles. But a commitment to merely quiddistic differences between worlds seems to be a consequence of
denying necessary connections.
Why is that? If there are no necessary connections between distinct existences, then the instantiation of
a fundamental property has no effect on which other properties are possibly instantiated, whether at the
same point or elsewhere in the world. This implies that any (logically possible) distribution of fundamental
properties across the mosaic is metaphysically possible. Consequently, there can be two metaphysically
possible worlds which differ merely in two fundamental properties ‘switching’ their distribution in the
mosaic. And, as we noted earlier, such worlds would be qualitatively indistinguishable.
The Humean, it seems, has to accept that there are possible worlds where fundamental properties switch
roles in this way. But nomic necessitarianism denies that properties can switch roles in this way. So, it seems
like the Humean can’t be a nomic necessitarian.
3 The Strategy
The argument outlined in the previous section suggests that we can’t combine the attractions of nomic
necessitarianism with those of Humeanism. However, the argument doesn’t conclusively show this. To see
this, consider again the discussion of the toy law in section 2.2. We argued that the existence of this toy law,
in combination with nomic necessitarianism, implied necessary connections between distinct existences.
However, it was vital for this argument that we were considering a law involving fundamental properties
and entities.
The law we considered was ‘whenever a spatial point has property A at time, tn, then it comes to have
property B at a later time, tn+1’ where A and B are fundamental properties. Since A and B are fundamental
and non-identical we know that they are distinct existences. And a nomic necessitarian view of this law
implies that there is a necessary connection between A and B.
However, if either A or Bwere non-fundamental, then the argument would not automatically go through
– A and B might not be distinct existences. And if A and B were not distinct existences, then a necessary
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connection between them does not violate (NNC). Consequently, it might be possible for the Humean to
allow that there is a metaphysically necessary law that As are followed by Bs – that any world where it
appears as if As are not followed by Bs is, in fact, as world without As (and without Bs) – if A and/or B are
non-fundamental.
This reasoning provides an opening for a Humean nomic necessitarian view. And it give us a powerful
constraint any such view must satisfy. In order to satisfy (NNC) it must be the case that whenever there is
a metaphysically necessary law relating A and B they are not distinct existences – that is, there’s some sort of
ontological dependence relation either between A and B, or between A, B, and some more fundamental C,
that renders the two non-distinct.
Clearly, developing a nomic necessitarian account of this kind requires a lot of work. That’s the aim of
the rest of the paper.
3.1 Two Types of Fundamentality
Before moving on, let’s highlight one worry you might have about this strategy. We’ve argued that it’s
possible to develop a view where non-fundamental properties can be related by metaphysically necessary
laws without violating the prohibition on necessary connections, so long as the non-fundamental properties
are not distinct existences. Doesn’t that mean that it’s not possible for the Humean to accept metaphysically
necessary laws relating fundamental physical properties?
Is it the case, then, that we can develop a Humean view where, e.g., chemical or biological or economic
properties have their nomic roles necessarily, but not properties like mass, charge and spin? An account
of Humean nomic essentialism that was only applicable to these special science properties would still be
interesting, but it’s value would be significantly diminished.
However, we think our proposal can apply to fundamental physical properties like mass, charge, and
spin. To see this, notice that in this discussion there are two senses of fundamentality at work. There is
a metaphysical sense of ‘fundamental’ – often glossed as being metaphysically primitive, or un-grounded –
which is how we’ve been using the term in the paper so far. And there is a scientific sense of ‘fundamental’
– differentiating our most basic science, fundamental physics, from the higher-level sciences, like statistical
mechanics, biology, economics, etc.3
We’ve argued that it’s possible for the Humean to accept metaphysically necessary laws connecting
metaphysically non-fundamental properties. If we can give an account of howmetaphysically non-fundamental
3In fact, many Humeans recently have been clear about this distinction between metaphysical and scientific fundamentality, e.g.
Bhogal and Perry (2017), Hicks and Schaffer (2017), Dorst (2019a), Bhogal (fort).
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properties can be scientifically fundamental then it’s possible for the Humean to accept metaphysically nec-
essary laws connecting scientifically fundamental properties – those of fundamental physics.
Notice, though, that the standard Humean approach to laws – the Best System account (BSA) – gets
us something close to this. It implies that the scientifically fundamental laws are metaphysically non-
fundamental. Let’s see how this works.
On the BSA the laws of nature are the axioms of the best systematization of the facts about the mosaic
– where ‘best’ means the systematization which best balances simplicity and informativeness. Slightly
more precisely, consider sets of axioms and the deductive closure of those axioms. Some sets of axioms
are informative about the mosaic – their deductive closure tells us a lot about the facts about the mosaics.
Some sets of axioms are simple, in the sense of being syntactically simple when written down – there are
few axioms and they are syntactically short. The axioms that best balance simplicity and informativeness
best systematize the mosaic. The axioms of the best system count as the laws (strictly speaking, on the
traditional version of the BSA it’s only the axioms that are universal generalizations that count as laws).
Importantly, given that the simplicity of a system is determined syntactically, there must be a privileged
language in which the truths in the system are expressed. For the traditional BSA, this language is one
where ‘the primitive vocabulary. . . refer to only the perfectly natural properties’ (Lewis, 1986, p. 42).
On this approach, the laws, including the laws of fundamental physics, are not metaphysically funda-
mental – they are grounded in facts about the mosaic. However, we need something that goes further than
this. The result we want is that properties that are part of the fundamental physics could be metaphysically
non-fundamental, even if they are scientifically fundamental. The standard BSA doesn’t get this result
because the laws are restricted to perfectly natural properties, which are metaphysically fundamental.
There are variants of the BSA which relax this restriction though, for example, Cohen and Callender
(2009), Loewer (2012b) and Schrenk (2006). But for the purposes of developing a Humean nomic neces-
sitarianism, the most suitable account of this kind is the “Two-State Humean” account we introduced in
Bhogal and Perry (2017) (building on a suggestion in Hall (2010)). As we’ll see in the next section, the
feature that makes our approach suitable for the Humean Nomic Essentialist, that neither Cohen and Cal-
lender, Schrenk, nor Loewer have, is the claim that some scientifically fundamental properties exist in virtue
of the same sort of procedure as what generates the laws. That’s what allows the view to avoid the problem of
quiddity.
Cohen and Callender and Schrenk’s accounts are formulated to allow for special science properties to
appear in laws generated by the best system (or some variant of the best system procedure). But, unlike
Two-State Humeanism, their accounts don’t say that the properties exist in virtue of the same things in
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virtue of which the laws exist.4
Loewer’s Package Deal Account (developed in Loewer (1996); Loewer (2007); Loewer (2012b) and most
recently Loewer (fort)) also doesn’t give an account where some set of scientifically fundamental properties
exist in virtue of the same sort of procedure as what generates the laws. Rather, it gives an account of
which properties are natural. The upshot of this is that role-switching is still possible on the package deal
account. Nothing in Loewer’s account prevents property P playing the mass role in one world, and property
Q playing that role in another. Loewer’s account merely implies that P would be natural in the former world
and Q in the latter.
Perhaps a variant of the Package Deal Account could be developed where the properties themselves
are generated by the best system procedure, not just their naturalness. We are happy to accept that such
a variant of the PDA might be a good candidate for building a Humean Nomic Essentialism. Though for
independent reasons we prefer our (2017) approach, but that’s not important for our purposes now.
We introduced two-state Humeanism in Bhogal and Perry (2017) as a way to account for the non-
separable physical states posited by quantum mechanics, but it can be applied much more widely. As
we will see in the next section the specific way this account allows for metaphysically non-fundamental
properties to be part of physically fundamental laws will help us to show how a fully Humean account can
satisfy the nomic necessitarian intuition. But first we should get the two-state Humean view on the table.
3.2 Two-State Humeanism
The standard BSA starts with the Humean mosaic and generates the laws of nature from that, via the
systemization procedure that we described above. The defender of the standard BSA thinks that there are
laws of nature, but takes them to be reduced to the Humean mosaic in this holistic way. The guiding idea of
Two-State Humeanism is that additional physical ontology can be generated from the mosaic via the same
sort of systemization procedure.
In Bhogal and Perry (2017) we used Two-State Humeanism to give a Humean account of the entan-
glement relationship posited by quantum mechanics. We argued that we can start with a sparse Humean
mosaic, one which ‘doesn’t seem to have any characteristically “quantum mechanical” states in it’ (p. 87)
and can generate, via the best system procedure, the fact that two particles are in a certain entangled state.
The terminology we used was that the parts of the physical state that are baked into the Humean mo-
4These two accounts are also ill-suited to the specific goals of a Nomic Necessitarianism about the scientifically fundamental.
Since they are theories about how to apply BSA-type accounts to special science laws, they allow for metaphysically non-fundamental
properties to appear in the laws by opening those laws up to apply to scientifically non-fundamental properties. But this differs from
a Humean Nomic Necessitarian account that is supposed to apply to scientifically fundamental properties.
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saic were called the M-state, while the parts of the physical state that are generated by this systemization
procedure were called the L-state. Let’s briefly look at how Two-State Humeanism generates the L-state out
of the M-state:
Start, for contrast, with the standard BSA. As we noted in the last section, this involves fixing on one
particular privileged language in which the axioms are expressed. The standard approach is for this lan-
guage to be one where ‘the primitive vocabulary. . . refer to only the perfectly natural properties’ (Lewis,
1986, p. 42). Two-State Humeanism loosens this requirement: In addition to the primitive vocabulary
that refer to only the perfectly natural properties (we call this the ‘base language’), Two-State Humeanism
allows any other predicate to be used in formulating the axioms of the system. But, very importantly, these
new predicates must come into the system uninterpreted.5
How, you might wonder, does uninterpreted vocabulary help one to formulate simple and informative
systems? After all, it’s uninterpreted, and ‘uninterpreted vocabulary’ is just a fancy way to say ‘meaningless
string’. The trick is that, in the context of the total system, what is introduced as uninterpreted vocabulary
doesn’t remain meaningless.
[Uninterpreted vocabulary] can have content. . . if the system contains sentences that contain
both novel vocabulary and the already interpreted vocabulary of the base language. For exam-
ple, a system S could introduce a novel, uninterpreted, predicate M(x) . . . [and] includes the
sentence ‘All Ms are Gs’, where G is a piece of already interpreted vocabulary, meaning, for
example, “has positive charge”. So the novel vocabulary,M , is linked to the already interpreted
vocabulary (Bhogal and Perry, 2017, p.78)
In fact, such novel vocabulary is often part of the best system of the world for the Two-State Humean.
When this is the case, the systemization procedure generates new elements of the physical state. For ex-
ample, if the predicate M(x) is part of the best system then that means that there is a property that M(x)
picks out that is part of the L-state. This property is generated by the systemization procedure and hence is
grounded in the whole mosaic, in the same way that laws generated by the BSA are grounded in the whole
mosaic.
In Bhogal and Perry (2017) we apply this to the entanglement phenomena of quantum mechanics –
saying that such properties are part of the L-state. However, the account can be applied more broadly. For
instance, it’s fairly natural for the Humean who accepts objective chance to take it to be part of the L-state,
since Humeans do not take facts about objective chance to be part of the mosaic. And further, Two-State
5If we don’t have this restriction then Two-State Humeanism falls prey to the ‘predicate F problem’ which is what motivated the
restriction of the language in which best systems are formulated in in the first place (Lewis, 1983, p. 367).
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Humeanism allows us great flexibility in which parts of the physical state are in the L-state and which are
in the M-state. One extreme view (which we mentioned but didn’t endorse in Bhogal and Perry (2017, fn.
6)) is, in the spirit of a suggestion by Hall (2010), that the mosaic merely consists in particles and their
positions in spacetime. There are no other features of the mosaic. Properties like mass and charge do exist,
but they are part of the L-state – generated by the systemization procedure.
We will discuss this view – call it “positions-first Humeanism” – more later, but the point now is that
it illustrates how Two-State Humeanism can allow us to take paradigm physical properties as part of the
L-state. If mass and charge are both part of the L-state then those properties are grounded in the whole
mosaic. And so, the properties have a common ground – they are not distinct existences. So, if this view
is true, there could be a metaphysically necessary law connecting mass and charge, without there being
necessary connections between distinct existences.
This thought points the way to how Two-State Humeanism could capture the nomic necessitarian in-
tuition that properties have their nomic roles necessarily. In the next section will be make these thoughts
precise.
A quick note on a related view before wemove on though: (Esfeld and Deckert, 2017) develop a Humean
view that also aims to avoid quiddities, and is similar in structure to a positions-first Two-State Humeanism.
Their approach starts with a Humean mosaic that consists just of distance relations between material ob-
jects. However, they are extremely deflationary about all other physical properties, saying, for example
‘there is no need to admit physical properties at all’ (p. 7). As a reviewer points out this deflationism
doesn’t rise to the level of anti-realism about these properties, because they think that such properties do
have extensions. But for Esfeld and Deckert, things like mass, charge, energy and spin are merely ‘param-
eters’ of the laws. And the modal character of these parameters is not clear.
Perhaps Esfeld and Deckert would, or should, accept a version of argument that we develop in the next
section – in order to establish that things like mass and charge can have their nomic role necessarily. For
example, they say that ‘parameters. . . are defined through the functional or causal role that they play for
the evolution of the particle configuration’ (p.51). But as it stands it’s not particularly clear how such a
definition of those parameters is supposed to go, and whether the resulting view would imply that pa-
rameters like mass have their nomic role necessarily. Further, while they sometimes seem sympathetic to
nomic necessitarian-style intuitions, they elsewhere seem to explicitly reject claims that there’s a necessary
connection between gravitational mass and its nomic role. They explicitly position their view as opposed
to views which imply that ‘the attractive motion of the particles is necessary given masses and the gravita-
tional force’, and argue that it’s a benefit of their view that such relationships turn out contingent (p.52).
Our aim, unlike theirs, is to argue that the Humean can capture these nomic necessitarian claims. We
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will bring this view up again when we further discuss positions-first Humeanism in section 5.
4 The Positive Argument
In this section we will argue that the Two-State Humean can capture the nomic necessitarian intuition that
properties have their nomic roles necessarily.
The nomic necessitarian view is that two physical properties at two different possible worlds are the
same property if and only if they play the same nomic role at their respective worlds. Therefore, we’re
interested in answering the question of under what conditions two physical properties at two different
possible worlds are the same property according to Two-State Humeanism.
For the ordinary Humean, the identity of a property is primitive and independent of any other condi-
tions. For the Two-State Humean, the answer depends on whether the property is part of the the ‘M-state’
(for which the ordinary Humean’s answer applies) or part of the L-state. We will argue that, for the physi-
cal ontology which makes up the L-state, the Two-State Humean satisfies the nomic necessitarian intuition.
The identity of an element of the L-state is closely dependent on the role it plays in the system of that world.
We will argue that this connection is tight enough to capture the nomic necessitarian intuition that these
properties have their nomic roles necessarily.6
6Why go to all this trouble of Two-State Humeanism? A reviewer suggests a much simpler strategy which also seems to generate
properties that have their nomic roles essentially, using only the resources of the ordinary BSA. Here’s the idea:
Start with a standard Lewisian BSA and imagine that it results in there being some property in the actual world that plays the mass
role – specifically, the property mass. But there are other worlds where some other property plays the mass role instead. Say for
example, in world w1 property P plays the mass role, and in w2 Q plays the mass role and so on. Then we can define a new property
that is coextensive with mass in the actual world, with P in w1 with Q in w2 etc. Call this property E. In effect, what’s going on is that
we are defining up the property of ‘instantiating a property that plays the mass role at your world’. There is a sense in which it might
appear that such a property necessarily plays the mass role – the objects that instantiate it always act in a mass-y way.
And of course, we can generalize this move to the charge role, and so on. So we can cook up properties that play those roles
necessarily.
This is an ingenious move, but we think that the Humean nomic essentialist shouldn’t make use of it. Here is the main concern:
This account is built upon assuming a standard Lewisian BSA approach to the laws, and using that to generate the nomic roles. The
problem with this is that, on the Lewisian approach, there’s a natural property that plays the mass role in the actual world – a natural
property that appears in the laws governing mass. The property E is not that property. The property E is in effect the property
‘instantiates a natural property that plays the mass role at your world’. That is not the property that is involved in, for example, the
Newtonian laws of gravitation. So, we think, property E does not in fact, play the mass role, and so is not suitable for the Humean
Nomic Essentialist.
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To capture the nomic necessitarian intuition, it suffices to establish Identity-Role Link:
Identity-Role Link: Two properties instantiated at possible worlds, w1 and w2 respectively, are
the same just in case they play the same nomic role in those worlds.
Identity-Role Link implies that at any possible world where a property, P, is instantiated must be one
where P plays the same nomic role as it does at any other world. This implies that P has its nomic role
necessarily.
We will argue that we can establish Identity-Role Link with respect to the properties which, according
to the Two-State Humean, comprise the L-state. This will show that the Two-State Humean can successfully
capture the nomic necessitarian intuition about some properties. Whether it’s a problem that this does not
apply to all properties accepted by the Two-State Humean, is a question we’ll address in the next section.
Here’s how the argument will go:
(1) Two L-state properties instantiated at possible worlds, w1 and w2 respectively, are the same just in
case they are denoted by L-state predicates with the same interpretation.
(2) Two L-state predicates, appearing in the best systems of possible worldsw1 andw2 respectively, have
the same interpretation just in case they play the same role in their respective best systems.
(3) For two L-state predicates to play the same role in their respective best systems just is for the nomic
roles of the properties they denote to be the same.
(4) Hence, Two L-state properties instantiated at possible worlds, w1 and w2 respectively, are the same
just in case they play the same nomic role in those worlds.
And (4) just is Identity-Role Link restricted to L-state properties, so the Two-State Humean satisfies the
nomic necessitarian intuition with respect to the L-state properties.
However, this argument is not exactly correct. Specifically, premise (3) is false. The role of a predicate
in the best system can outrun the nomic role of the property it denotes. We’ll carry on with this slightly
inaccurate version of the argument for now before discussing how to fix it in section 4.2.
4.1 The Argument
Premise 1:
This premise just comes from the way the Two-State Humean defines the L-state in terms of the best
systems apparatus. On the Two-State Humean viewM-state properties are fundamental. L-state properties,
on the other hand, exist in virtue of being denoted by an L-state predicate that’s part of the best system. The
nature and identity of an L-state property is wholly determined by the interpretation given to the predicate
introduced in the best system to refer to them.
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And so it just follows that two L-state properties instantiated at possible worlds, w1 and w2 respectively,
are the same just in case they are denoted by L-state predicates with the same interpretation.
Premise 2:
L-state predicates gain their interpretation via the existence of sentences in the system that link them
to other vocabulary. For example, if a system includes the sentence ‘All Fs are Gs’, where F is a L-state
predicate and G means ‘has positive charge’ then F gains its interpretation in part by its connection to the
property of having positive charge. And further, the interpretation of F will depend on what the other
sentences in the system says about things with positive charge. If it’s a law that all Gs are Hs, for example,
then this affects the interpretation of F.
More generally, the interpretation of an L-state predicate, F, is determined by the all axioms of the best
system that connect F to other predicates {P1 . . .Pn} and all the axioms that connect the members of {P1 . . .Pn}
to other predicates {Q1 . . .Qn}, and so on.
So the interpretation of a predicate is a matter of this web of connections branching out to the rest of the
best system. Call the position of a particular L-state predicate in this network of links to other vocabulary
in the system the role of that predicate in the best system.7 So, two L-state predicates, appearing in the best
systems of possible worlds w1 and w2 respectively, have the same interpretation just in case they play the
same role in their respective best systems.
Premise 3:
There is a clear intuition behind (iii): on the Two-State Humean approach, just as on the traditional
BSA, the laws are defined by the best system procedure – the laws are the axioms of the best system. So it
seems like for two predicates to play the same role in the best systems is just for the role of the properties
they denote in the laws to be the same – that is, for those properties to have the same nomic role.
As we noted, this premise isn’t exactly right, but let’s assume it for the time being. We’ll address how
the argument works with its more nuanced replacement later on.
Premises 1, 2, and 3 imply Claim 4:
7Youmight be tempted to think that this boils down to the requirementwhole system in which the L-state predicates are embedded
being the same. While this would be simple, it wouldn’t be strictly correct. It’s possible that two L-state predicates may play the
same role in their respective best systems despite the systems being different, because of (e.g.) some isolated “pocket” of physical
phenomena whose laws and systematization doesn’t overlap at all with the pocket containing those two predicates. Think of the case
of the property inertial mass in an ordinary Newtonian world vs. a world that has ordinary Newtonian physics but in which there
are also completely epiphenomenal immaterial ghosts (that can neither influence nor be influenced by material things). Insofar as
it seems plausible that the role of the predicate “has inertial mass of 2kg” in the best system would be unchanged if we added an
isolated pocket of laws about immaterial ghosts to our best system, then it cannot be that sameness of role in the best system requires
sameness of the entire best system.
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Suppose that L1 and L2 are L-state properties instantiated at possible worlds, w1 and w2, respectively.
In order to establish Identity-Role Link with respect to this set of properties it suffices to show that L1 = L2
if and only if L1 plays the same nomic role at w1 as L2 plays at w2.
Consider the left to right direction first: Suppose L1 = L2. It suffices to show that L1 plays the same
nomic role at w1 as L2 plays at w2.
By premise 1, since L1 = L2 then L1 and L2 are denoted by L-state predicates in the best systems of w1
and W2 (respectively) with the same interpretation. Call those predicates ‘P’ and ‘Q’.
By premise 2, since ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are L-state predicates with the same interpretation, they play the same
role in the best systems of w1 andW2, respectively. By premise 3, the properties ‘P’ and ‘Q’ denote play the
same nomic role at those worlds. Since ‘P’ and ‘Q’ denote L1 and L2, respectively, then L1 and L2 play the
same nomic role at w1 and w2, respectively.
Right to left: Suppose L1 plays the same nomic role at w1 as L2 plays at w2. It suffices to show that
L1 = L2.
By the definition of the L-state, since L1 and L2 are L-state properties, they are denoted by L-state
predicates, call those predicates ‘P’ and ‘Q’, respectively. By premise 3, since L1 plays the same nomic role
at w1 as L2 plays at w2, then ‘P’ must play the same role in the best system of w1 as ‘Q’ plays in the best
system of w2.
By premise 2, since ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are L-state predicates which play the same role in their respective best
systems, ‘P’ and ‘Q’ have the same interpretation. By premise 1, since ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are two L-state predicates
with the same interpretation, and ‘P’ and ‘Q’ denote L1 and L2, respectively, then L1 and L2 must be the
same property – i.e. L1 = L2.
Since both directions of the biconditional hold, then it follows that L1 = L2 if and only if L1 plays the
same nomic role atw1 as L2 plays atw2. This directly implies that, for the Two-State Humean, Identity-Role
Link is satisfied for L-state properties. That is, for the L-state properties:
Identity-Role Link: Two properties instantiated at possible worlds, w1 and w2 respectively, are
the same just in case they play the same nomic role in those worlds.
And, as we argued at the beginning of this section, satisfying Identity-Role Link is sufficient to capture
the nomic necessitarian intuition, because it implies that properties have their nomic role necessarily. Since
the Two-State Humean satisfies this principle for the class of properties which make up the L-state, then it
captures the nomic necessitarian intuition, with respect to those properties.
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4.2 AWrinkle
The above argument is, however, not quite correct. Premise 3 is a bit too strong.
Premise 3 says that: For two L-state predicates to play the same role in their respective best systems just
is for the nomic roles of the properties they denote to be the same.
However, the best system is not a purely nomic entity. It contains non-nomic boundary conditions
as well as laws. The best system is, roughly, the deductive closure of statements which best systematize
the facts about the mosaic, balancing simplicity and informativeness. Nothing about that systematization
requires that it only include laws; it may include contingent things, like the precise boundary conditions.
In fact, such intuitively contingent boundary conditions seem like they will be required for the system to
be informative. A system where the axioms are only the laws of Newtonian mechanics, for example, would
not be particularly informative on it’s own – it needs the addition of boundary conditions specifying what
objects there are, their mass, their velocity, and so on.
So, it’s false that for two L-state predicates to play the same role in their respective best systems just
is for the nomic roles of the properties they denote to be the same. The left hand side implies the right,
but not vice versa. Two L-state predicates could play different roles in their respective best systems, but
the properties they denote could still play the same nomic role, if those differences are restricted to the
non-nomic parts of the best system.
The natural solution is to distinguish between the genuinely nomic parts of the best system and the
non-nomic parts. Then the Two-State Humean could claim that two L-state properties are the same if and
only if they are denoted by terms such that the nomic elements of the systems in which they are embedded,
and their connections to the nomic elements of that system, are the same. So premise 3 would be adapted:
Premise 3
′
For two L-state predicates to play the same role in the nomic elements of their respective best
systems just is for the nomic roles of the properties they denote to be the same.
This change will percolate outwards to other parts of the argument. Specifically, Premise 2 would need
to be changed too in the following way:
Premise 2
′
Two L-state predicates, appearing in the best systems of possible worlds w1 and w2 re-
spectively, have the same interpretation just in case they play the same role in the nomic elements of their
respective best systems.
(The italicized text is added to the original formulation of premise 2.)
Earlier we said that the interpretation of a predicate is a matter of it’s web of connections branching
out to the rest of the best system. But, in light of this issue, the right thing for the Two-State Humean to
say is that only some of the connections to other elements of the best system will be relevant to an L-state
17
predicate’s interpretation. Whether or not some L-state property at another world is mass depends on what
the laws are, not on which particular objects are assigned which masses as part of the initial conditions.
Notice that tweaking our original premises in this way will not interfere with the success of our original
argument. It still follows that L-state properties will have their nomic roles necessarily.
But how can the Two-State Humean make the distinction between the nomic and the non-nomic el-
ements of a best system? Luckily, such a distinction has been part of the traditional understanding of
the BSA. As we noted, the systems that best balance simplicity and informativeness will typically contain
things which are intuitively non-nomic boundary conditions. So when the BSA is used as an account of
what the laws are some way of distinguishing the laws and the boundary conditions is required. Lewis
(1983, p. 367) distinguishes between the nomic and non-nomic elements of the system syntactically – the
laws are the parts of the best system that are universal generalizations, the parts of the system that are not
generalizations are treated as non-nomic boundary conditions. Hall (2010) does something more radical,
building the distinction between laws and background conditions into the systemization procedure itself.
He takes systems to come in two parts – an initial condition hypothesis, and a dynamic hypothesis – these
are distinguished via different standards of informativeness applying to the two parts of the system. (This
idea is further developed by Hicks (2018), Dorst (2019b) and Jaag and Loew (fort).)8
The Two-State Humean can appeal to these kinds of strategies to distinguish the laws from the other
elements of the system. Whichever way the defender of the traditional BSA chooses to distinguish the laws
from the background conditions, the Two-State Humean can replicate it.
5 Limitations of this Account
We’ve argued that the Humean can capture the nomic necessitarian intuitions that we discussed in section
1. But it’s important to be clear about the limitations of the argument. In particular, it only applies to
properties in the L-state.
That is, the Two-State Humean doesn’t say that every property has its nomic role necessarily, only the
L-state properties. The M-state properties – the properties that make up the Humean mosaic – do not.
So, there is some truth to the traditional thought that Humeanism is inconsistent with properties having
their nomic role necessarily. Even the Two-State Humean must put something in the M-state, or else there’s
8Sometimes this part of the BSA view goes unnoticed, because certain variants of the BSA, notably the so-called “Mentaculus”
approach developed by Loewer (2012a) and Albert (2000) reject splitting the best system into nomic and non-nomic elements. Instead,
they claim that all the axioms of the best system count as laws, even those which might intuitively appear to be contingent background
conditions. (For example, they take the Past Hypothesis – the claim that at its earliest stages the universe had very low entropy – to
be a law.)
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nothing for the best system to ‘latch on’ to. For the Humean, then, not every property can have it’s nomic
role necessarily. In this way the Humean nomic necessitarian view is not as thoroughgoing as traditional
nomic necessitarian views.
There is a further issue that follows from this: M-state properties are quiddistic. If property switching
is possible between properties in the M-state, then there will be genuinely distinct possible worlds that
are qualitatively indistinguishable. Adding the L-state machinery on top doesn’t change this epistemic
problem.
In such pairs of worlds where M-state properties switch, our view implies exactly what the ordinary
Humean view implies about such a case: the laws of those worlds will be different. Just as the laws of the
two worlds will be different, so too the L-state properties defined in terms of those laws will be different
(because the L-state properties will have different nomic roles, since they feature in different laws).
So, the Two-State Humean has to allow that certain properties are part of the M-state and so not defined
by their nomic role. And if switching is possible between these M-state properties then the view faces some
of the epistemic issues that face traditional Humeanism.
These seem like limitations of the Two-State Humean view. However, the extent to which these limita-
tions are significant will vary depending on the version of the view we accept. In particular, as we noted
in section 3.2, there are a range of possible Two-State Humean views which vary in which properties are
part of the L-state and which are part of the M-state. Consequently, these different views vary on which
properties have their nomic roles necessarily and whether they allow for property switching.
For example, one extreme position that we mentioned in section 3.2 is ‘positions-first’ Humeanism,
according to which the mosaic consists of nothing but particles occupying positions in space-time. Every
other physical property or relation would be derived from this extremely sparse mosaic. On this view there
could be a world with rich physical ontology (like the masses and charges of the particles, the distribution
of electromagnetic field values, and so on), but those things would be part of the L-state posited by the
best systematization of the positions-only mosaic. Such a Humean would admit of very few quiddistic
properties – position would be quiddistic, but not mass and charge. So, she would resemble the nomic
necessitarian in her claims about the modal profile of most physical properties.
Even for the positions first view, there will be a limit – we can’t say that every physical property has its
nomic role necessarily. But, perhaps, it might not be such a disadvantage that the positions-first Humean
says position doesn’t have its nomic role necessarily. Do we think that position is the type of property that
must have its nomic role necessarily? It’s intuitive to claim that nothing can be positively charged if it
doesn’t repel other things that are positively charged. But things look different with position. Imagine we
live in a Newtonian world, then part the nomic role of position is to do with the law of gravitation. Do
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we think that if the laws of gravitation were different then there would be no such thing as position? That
if gravitation followed an inverse-cube law nothing would be positioned anywhere (but, rather, would be
schmositioned)?9
And further, notice that positions-first Humeanism doesn’t face the epistemic problems that arise from
the possibility of property-switching. Even if you think position is a quiddistic property, if there’s only one
quiddistic property, then there is no possible role-switching between distinct quiddities.
So, on the positions-first variant of Two-State Humeanism the limitations that we mentioned don’t seem
particularly significant – there is no property-switching and position is the only property that doesn’t have
it’s nomic role essentially.10
The point here is not necessarily to commit to positions-first Humeanism,11 but rather to note that Two-
State Humeanism opens up a range of possibilities, depending on which properties are in the M-state and
which are in the L-state, some of which might be very attractive.
Indeed, a promising upshot of the possibility of a Humean nomic essentialism is that the Humean can
meaningfully ask (and answer!) the question of which physical properties (if any) should have their nomic
role essentially. The traditional Humean says that all fundamental physical properties must be quiddistic.
The Humean nomic essentialist has far more flexibility here; even if she must admit of quiddistic properties
somewhere, she has the ability to choose the nature and extent of the quidditism she admits.
6 Conclusion
We have claimed, contrary to the general consensus, that Humeanmetaphysics can be made consistent with
an approach to properties where properties are deeply tied up with their nomic role – where a property
could not have had a nomic role other than the one it actually has. We presented a positive argument
that certain Humean accounts of laws of nature and the physical world can satisfy the nomic necessitarian
intuitions.
In section 2, we explained the nature of the apparent conflict between the Humean worldview and
9This is not obvious, and views can reasonably differ on this. (For example, Esfeld and Deckert (2017) defend a similar sort of
view, on which the Humean mosaic merely consists of material bodies and distance relations between them. Darby (2018) objects that
Esfeld and Deckert’s view might not avoid quidditism in the case of distance, but Esfeld and Deckert disagree.)
10One might push it even further, and make this same point for a view which admits of multiple kinds of M-state properties, but
only ones that, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, could not play any other M-state property’s role. This may be for structural
reasons, for instance if the M-state properties include only the continuous determinable monadic quantity, mass, and the determinate
relation, ‘x is equal to or less than one angstrom away from y’.
11And, indeed, objections have recently been raised for closely related views (like Esfeld’s Super-Humeanism) by, e.g., Matarese
(2020).
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nomic necessitarianism about properties, and how commitment to quiddistic properties seemed inextrica-
bly tied to the core tenets of the Humean position. We then, in section 3, argued for the possibility of a
view which satisfied both the nomic necessitarian intuition and the core tenets of the Humean worldview,
by arguing that non-fundamental properties are able to sidestep the prohibition on necessary connections
between distinct existences.
By the end of section 3, we went beyond the mere possibility of such a view, and sketched out what a
Humean nomic necessitarian position might look like. Specifically, we argue that the Two-State Humean
picture, first introduced in Bhogal and Perry (2017), admits of a class of properties, the L-state properties,
which are non-fundamental and grounded in holistic facts about the mosaic, and are perfect candidate for
properties which could be both Humean and have their nomic roles necessarily. In section 4, we argued
that L-state properties, according to the Two-State Humean picture, indeed have their nomic roles neces-
sarily. We closed by examining some limitations of the view, and specifically questioned whether nomic
necessitarianism about some, but not all physical properties still satisfies the nomic necessitarian intuition.
6.1 The Essentialist Intuition
So far, we’ve focused on the nomic necessitarian intuition. But what about the title of the paper? Are there
any prospects for a Humean nomic essentialism? The nomic essentialist intuition, as we said before, is the
idea that to be charge or mass just is to play a certain nomic role; that the essence of these physical properties
and relations is to play such-and-such nomic role.12 We think that the view developed in this paper captures
this intuition too. Given what’s come earlier – specifically, given that we’ve established the viability of a
genuinely Humean nomic necessitarianism, using the tools of Two-State Humeanism – we can argue for
this very quickly.
We’ve established, already, that L-state properties admitted by the Two-State Humean as part of the
best system have their nomic roles necessarily. To capture the nomic essentialist intuition, the essence of an
L-state property must be its nomic role. Where should we look, then, for the essence of an L-state property?
On the Two-State Humean approach, physical ontology that’s part of the L-state is introduced via the
addition of a corresponding predicate to the (candidate) best system. And, we’ve said before, the nature
and identity of an L-state property is wholly determined by the interpretation of the L-state predicate
introduced in the best system to refer to them. The L-state property is generated from the role of the
corresponding L-state predicate in the system.
But, when L-state predicates are added to a system, they come in uninterpreted; what makes it the
12If you are uncomfortable with talk of essences, you can understand this claim as an identity thesis, according to which the
physical property is identical to a certain disposition to behave. Cf. Shoemaker (1980) and, more recently, Chakravartty (2003).
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case that a predicate, ‘P’, introduced to the best system, denotes a property like positive charge is that
the predicate features in certain laws in that system about the behavior of the particles in the mosaic.
An L-state property has no nature beyond what the corresponding predicate, ‘P’, contributes, and L-state
predicates have no interpretation beyond what falls out of their role in (the nomic part of) the best system.
For the Two-State Humean, even though L-state predicates start off uninterpreted, the laws give them an
interpretation, and so it’s the laws that characterize what the properties those predicates denote are.
It seems, then, that the essential nature of an L-state property is determined by the role the correspond-
ing predicate has in laws that describe the behavior of the objects in the mosaic. It’s because ‘P’ plays the
charge role in this best system that it’s correct to say that the property it denotes is positive charge.
In this way, the Humean nomic essentialist is able to do justice to the essentialist intuition. It can offer
a clear, non-metaphorical, picture of what the world must be like for the essence of a property, for ‘what it
is’ to be that property, to be nothing over and above that property’s nomic role. In fact, the Humean nomic
essentialist can explainwhy the L-state properties have their nomic role essentially – it’s due to the way that
the L-state properties are generated in a systematization procedure.
There are deep attractions to nomic essentialist and nomic necessitarian views, and, previously, it had
been thought the only way to enjoy these attractions was to accept an inflated anti-Humean ontology as the
cost of admission. But we’ve argued that this is wrong. You can capture a nomic essentialist view, though
one that isn’t quite as thoroughgoing as traditional versions, without giving up on a Humean metaphysics.
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